Commercial aerial drone applications – an End-User’s Perspective

Melissa S Hersh 

While the topic of commercial drones has generated lots of policy conversation, controversy, confusion, and competition for market presence, to date, there’s been a failure to address the true focus of the technology –the user. Consequently, it’s time to move from narrow discussions on privacy, fund raising, and legislation, to understanding what the concerns of law enforcement, security officers, and businesses are, as they are actually going to be the ones using this technology.

So, let’s sidestep the regulatory quicksand for the moment, and turn our attention to those considering using commercial UAS and those concerned about how to protect against errant or intentionally hostile UAS. As an end-user, there is still very little informed guidance, full stop.  And, having a permissive regulatory environment will not alone address the challenges posed by UAS. Those tasked with operational jobs to perform and ensure safety, security, and business continuity may be looking at how to efficiently and effectively employ the use of UAS platforms to deliver services or provide data both necessary and sufficient to supplant or complement the use of existing inspection, surveillance, and monitoring practices.  Additionally, there are those tasked with preventing operational disruption of any kind that must consider what, when, how, where, why, and who is (or should) be responsible for preventing autonomous or semi-autonomous platforms from causing losses.

Considering the use of UAS (as an enabling technology) into operational planning requires a thoughtful assessment that looks at risk across the spectrum – from financing to reputation. While there is more data available on the performance of commercial UAS for particular purposes such as inspecting critical infrastructure; monitoring agricultural processes; facilitating faster claims management; etc. there is very limited data on the efficacy of counter-UAS capabilities. The tacit assumption that employing the use of spin-off military counter drone systems will be easy peasy lemon squeesy, is anything but.

There are very real limitations constraining end-users or prospective end-users considering the incorporation of UAS into their risk mitigation strategies. Furthermore, the technical, political, and doctrinal gaps that frame what, why, when, how, where, and who should be responsible for countering negligent or unintentionally errant drones or drones piloted with hostile intent are significant. Alleged technical solutions – reliable or not – are only one part of the equation.

What is it that needs to be detected? Why are we seeking to detect low, slow, and possibly recreational drones?  Are we afraid of the platform, vehicle, payload, sensors, use of the data? Are we more worried about aerial drones as opposed to terrestrial, amphibious, or submersible drones? Are we more worried about UAS as opposed to our phone and internet searches? What method(s) should we employ when intercepting or interdicting a drone – kinetic, electronic, both? Even if I’m successful in making a kill of the platform, how do I gain control or take control of the data collected, if any? When do we need to detect? And when do we need to interdict? How does detection help if there’s no viable interdiction/interception capability? How do I know the UAS will respond to the countermeasure when the system to be countered was not manufactured or cobbled together using standardized processes or systems? Where might I want to consider positioning counter-UAS capabilities, or do we consider everywhere a risk? What sort of vulnerability or threat assessment will be used? Do I share this with local law enforcement? Who should be the ones employing this technology? If a private operator detects it, can they respond? What are the rules of engagement for law enforcement, private military companies, corporate security providers? Is the possible liability associated with collateral damage from and interdicting a ‘rogue drone’ more acceptable than the collateral damage from doing nothing? Who decides?

Chief Security Officers are frantically doing internet searches and speaking to industry colleagues on what system is the right counter-UAS to achieve their goals. Search engine optimization makes ‘finding’ a solution easy. Yet, how do CSO’s actually know what works and what doesn’t? While the US Government is getting closer to putting money behind funding the type of research, testing & evaluation, and simulations necessary to build a playbook on best practices both for the beneficial uses that UAS can provide to those in charge of ensuring operational continuity, safety, and security in CONUS environments, and the sufficient criteria for determining what, how, when, who, where, and why to use counter UAS – today’s landscape remains pretty barren. Also, what about enterprises – private and public – that have OCONUS operations? This begs the question, what role can and should the private sector play with respect to demonstrating that their products and systems are viable, reliable, and accurate? How much data is needed to demonstrate an acceptable amount to ensure defensible decision-making?

The outlook is not grim, but it is complex. There is room for private-public cooperation to help build out the operational frameworks necessary for reliably using drones in the pursuit of safety and security as well as for counter-UAS technologies.

Melissa S Hersh is a Washington D.C.-based risk analyst and consultant, Principal, Hersh Consulting, LLC.

Michael Hopmeier is President of Unconventional Concepts, Inc., an engineering and policy consulting

firm specializing in national security issues. He is also a consultant and senior advisor to numerous

government agencies and organizations. Views expressed are their own